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Moynihan: Technology and Human Freedom

Technology
and Human
Freedom
Daniel Patrick
Moynihan

I

"Technology and Human Freedom"
was a speech delivered by Senator
Moynihan at Syracuse University on
January 28, 1979. The present version has been somewhat modified
for purposes of publication in
Syracuse Scholar.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, United
States senator from New York since
1977, is th e author and editor of
many books and articles including
The Politics of a Guaranteed Income;
Coping: On the Practice of Government; and the prize-winning Beyond
the Melting Pot (coauthor). Senator
Moynihan has taught at Harvard
and has held numerous government
positions including ambassador to
India, United Nations permanent
representative, and cabinet member.
He received a Ph .D. in 1961 from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
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f I were to offer any far-reaching thought on technology and
human freedom, it would be that our very choice of subject
reveals the pervasive and scarcely concluded impact of
technology on our society.
A century ago, for example, the good Methodists who played
so large a part in the founding of Syracuse University earnestly
affirmed the freedom of the human will, although they saw their
adversary in the Calvinist theology of predestination rather than
the realm of technology. The debate between the Calvinists and
the Arminians still persists, but no longer does it command the
same attention. It has been transmuted-or is it merely redefined
-into secular terms? Today the debate between determinism and
freedom is more often cast as a debate over the implications of
science and technology for the human prospect.
In my view, only a person of what St. Augustine would have
termed "indomitable ignorance" could deny that technology has
vastly enhanced human freedom. The lot of the better part of
mankind, up until just barely a moment ago in history, was
scarcely human as we think of the word. The most that could be
said for what Marx termed "the idiocy of rural life" is that, as the
phrase suggests, those involved were scarcely aware of their
condition. The historian J. H. Plumb, who has inquired unsentimentally into the social condition in England at the beginning of
the industrial era, writes:
No one in his senses would choose to have been born in a previous
age unless he could be certain that he would have enjoyed extremely
good health, and that he could have accepted stoically the death of the
majority of his children.

Now there are those-the clear persistence of a certain religious
sensibility- who would assert that the previous condition of
mankind, precisely because of its suffering and pain, its brevity
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and uncertainty, its cruelty and violence, was more human. That
may be. But none, I suspect, would assert that such a condition
embodied more human freedom.
Freedom is choice, and technology vastly enhances choice-at
least up to a point. Some will argue that, beyond this point,
technology means control and the diminution of liberty; it was
such a possibility that stirred the imaginations of the authors of
Brave New World and 1984. Other critics hold that the choices
technology offers are in some sense false. C. P. Snow refers to
adherents of the latter view as "the literary intellectuals," who
regard the culture of science and technology at its best as "shallowly optimistic, unaware of man's condition." Optimistic is indeed an apt term, for (from that" donnish perspective) what better
describes democracy than the politics of optimism? The relation
between technology and democracy is intimate. In the third volume of his historical trilogy entitled The Americans: The Democractic Experience, Daniel Boorstin argues that technological advance
comes most readily to a democratic political culture and, if I read
him correctly, most easily makes its impress on such a culture.
Experimentation, variety, optimism: these are the ingreqients of
both technology and democracy.
Now to the main theme of this discussion: It appears to me that
we are in a period when antitechnological sentiment is fairly high
in the political culture. It may be subsiding somewhat. I hope it
will subside more; for I feel that the position of the United States
in the world, and thereby the condition of human freedom in its
most direct sense, is being eroded by a weakening technological
momentum in America. This condition is much advanced in New
York State, incidentally, which was until recently among the most
technologically innovative states in the nation. Our circumstances here may in some measure anticipate the experience
of others.
It may be that this antitechnological animus rises and falls in
almost cyclical patterns. Clearly the last upsurge began in the
early sixties; it was itself a reaction against the somewhat desperate enthusiasm for scientific and technological education that
followed upon the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957. I was
in Syracuse at that time, and I should acknowledge that I was
already among those who associated technology with uninspiring purposes and lesser callings. At issue during the early sixties
was the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the first great
education enactment of the modern era.
To go back for a moment, there was an elemental reason why
the Russians reached space first: They had tried harder. Our
scientists and engineers were fully as good as theirs-even better.
But theirs had been provided considerably greater resources,
and, given the essentially technological nature of the task, these
resources had the predictable result. But instead of asking what
was wrong with the Bureau of the Budget, we turned instead on
American education and, by extension, on American culture.
Five weeks after the launching of Sputnik I, the U.S . Office of
Education released one of its few publications ever to be featured
in a lead story in the New York Times. It proclaimed that the Soviet
https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol1/iss1/8
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Union was outstripping the United States in the production of
certain types of technological manpower; that Soviet schools
taught much more in the way of science and technical subjects;
and that children gifted in those subjects were singled out in the
Soviet Union for special education.
The report and its consequent publicity aroused such a furor
that two days later President Eisenhower gave a nationally televised address in which he proposed a sweeping federal program
to encourage scientific and technical education. The National
Defense Education Act (NDEA) followed.
The problem, as I saw it, was that the 1958 NDEA addressed a
technical issue (quality of education) that did not exist, rather
than a political problem (budgetary allocation) that did. Some
twenty years later, it seems to me, the problem persists. The
Russians go on applying resources to their military, with predictable results. In the main, we do not- despite what you have
heard. I doubt that a SALT treaty will get us out of that dilemma.
In addition, there was a particularly obnoxious loyalty oath
attached to every stage of the application process for NDEA
loans. This seemed to me a greater threat to American education
than the shortage of engineers or the quality of scientists- both,
incidentally, false issues, as the spectacular success of the Apollo
project was to show when the president a decade later mobilized
the political will to venture into space. There was also a deliberate
effort in the NDEA legislation to diminish the research capacity of
older regions such as the Northeast and to build new graduate
facilities in the South and West. I noted this at the time, but with
nothing like the alarm with which it would strike me today.
Paradoxically, the great transformation in the federal role in
education that began with the passage of the National Defense
Education Act, whether good or bad for education, had little
bearing on our military capability. In fact, far from producing a
host of scientific myrmidons, it helped to educate a generation
that turned its best energies and skills to protesting the war in
Vietnam and to bringing about a great shift in federal prioritiesaway from national defense and toward various kinds of domestic social endeavors. Education prospered, but not the kind of
education that had been so earnestly pledged in the panic following Sputnik. Indeed, as education budgets and enrollments grew,
the proportion of science students registered in college and university programs appears to have declined. Although the annual
federal expenditures for higher education rose tenfold between
1960 and 1975 (from $916 million in 1960, measured in constant
dollars, to $9,670 million in 1975), the percentage of all students in
higher education awarded degrees in engineering and the physical sciences declined almost by half over the same period (from
13.9 percent in 1960 to 7.6 percent in 1975). A distinct antitechnological mood had come over us.
I do not know how close the connection is with such cultural
movements and, for example, the decline in industrial productivity. But it appears evident that the political sphere is once more
beginning to stir with impulses similar to those of the late 1950s.
In Washington, the Department of Commerce has set in motion a
Published by SURFACE, 1979
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domestic policy review of industrial innovation. Here in New
York State, the governor has established a task force on hightechnology opportunity. The American Association for the
Advancement of Science has held its own conferences on the
subject.
I believe that government can and should seek to advance
technology-as a condition of social progress, let alone security.
But I would hope that this time around we would be a bit more
sophisticated about it. There is nothing really the matter with our
science: it is dominant in the world today. The question is, How
can we connect it with technology? I dare to suggest that this is
our first problem. It is no simple matter, to be resolved with a flick
of a switch. Men of great scientific creativity can be as technologically uncomprehending as the rest of us. It may be recalled that in
1933, at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science, a theoretical genius of particle physics, Ernest Rutherford, declared: "We cannot control atomic energy to an extent
which would be of any value commercially, and I believe we are
not likely ever to be able to do so." But just nine years later the
first pile had begun to run at Stagg Field in Chicago- with
government intervention.
I would like now to consider the situation in which government
and other institutions retard technology. The most intriguing
assessment of our difficulties in sustaining the rate of technological advance that I have come upon is that of Mancur Olson, in a
paper given at the American Political Science Association in 1978,
nominally on the subject of Britain. It was Professor Olson's
thesis that the very liberty of societies such as ours (the liberty
that, in Daniel Boorstin's view, so encouraged technological advance during the past century) may now be the source of developments that make innovation considerably more difficult. A free
society permits a host of interest groups to grow up- unions,
professional societies, trade associations, business combinations.
Soon these interest groups begin to exercise a powerful influence
upon economic decision making. Competition and entry into the
marketplace are restricted; wages are regulated; entrepreneurial
choice is limited in a number of ways. While the existence of such
common-interest organizations may have many benefits, they
will at times, as Professor Olson concludes, "have a substantial
adverse effect on the rate of growth of an economy." This is
especially so when there are many such interest groups, when
their purposes and constituencies are relatively narrow, and
when they possess sufficient vigor. The paradox, he argues, is
that
Those countries which have had democratic freedom of organization
without upheaval the longest, will suffer the most from growthrepressing organizations and combinations.

Some will find this a startling thesis. But before lurching to
assumptions about Olson's conclusions, consider what the argument explains. Germany and Japan, the economic miracles of
recent times, were both devastated in social terms by World War
II. At the beginning of the postwar era, each was a sort of
https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol1/iss1/8
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economic tabula rasa. Each developed strong democratic institutions, but those institutions represented large constituencies and
purposes and therefore had no compulsion to intrude into the
small affairs of day-to-day economic life.
On the other hand, note Professor Olson's description of
Britain:
Britain has precisely the dense and powerful network of
common-interest organizations ... [to be expected] in a country with
such a record of military security and democratic stability. The number
and power of its trade unions is too well known to need description.
The venerability and power of its professional associations is less
famous, but still striking; consider the institutionalized distinction
between solicitors and barristers, which could not possibly have
emerged , .. in a free market innocent of professional associations or
government regulations .... Britain also has a strong Farmers' Union
and a great many trade associations of one sort or another. It is also
the land where the word "establishment" first came to have its
broader modern meaning, and .. . it does still suggest a substantial
degree of informal organization of a sort that usually would emerge
only gradually in a stable society. Many of the powerful commoninterest organizations in Britain are, moreover, narrow rather than
encompassing. There are, for example, a wide variety of different and
essentially autonomous trade unions representing different workers in
the same factory, and no union encompasses a substantial fraction of
the working population of the country.

Professor Olson and an associate, Mr. Kwang Choi, have also
applied their hypothesis to a study of the differences in the recent
rates of growth of the various American states. Mr. Choi found
that, excepting the states of the old Confederacy, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the number of
years since an area attained statehood and the current rate of that
state's economic growth; that is, the longer an area has been a
state, the lower its rate of economic growth. And if one assumes
that full freedom of economic innovation was not present in the
South until after the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights
Acts of the mid-1960s, the currently high growth rates of those
states will fit the Olson model.
This hypothesis may provide some clue to the vastly different
experiences of New York and California, states of comparable size
and potential for research and development. In fiscal year 1977
New York received $1.2 billion in federal research and development funds, while California received $6.1 billion. In percentage
terms, New York received 5.2 percent of the total, while California received 26 percent. New York received more dollars for
research and development in 1965 than it did one decade later-a
net absolute decline of $232 million over the period.
In 1976 we had a good year for government grants, with an
administration trying to spend itself into reelection. Research and
development funds going to New York increased by $49 million.
But for California, the increase was $656 million. So we had a
1-to-5 absolute ratio with California and something like a 1-to-13
growth ratio.
Now it is not our universities or our scientists who are responsible for this imbalance; or at least the imbalance does not make its
appearance among them. It is rather in the industrial sphere that
Published by SURFACE, 1979
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New York State's performance is so very lacking. Dr. Paul H.
Silverman, provost for research and graduate studies of the State
University, has addressed himself to this matter with great skill.
He suggests that when the major private research and development facilities were being established in the two decades after
World War II, the tax climate in New York made it undesirable for
them to locate here. But this would hardly conflict with Olson's
thesis.
Finally, let me return to our national problem of slow
technological innovation and leave you with this thought: Can it
be that the decline of American technology in the seventies has
come about because we no longer feel the imperative to exploit
technology for our self-defense? Perhaps the issue of technology
and human freedom puts the matter the wrong way around.
Perhaps it is from our commitment to protect and extend human
freedom that we develop the technology that makes such a commitment possible to implement; and perhaps a certain waning of
the passion for liberty among us has brought a slackening in our
rate of technological advance.
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